Nuclear Security Regulations (SOR/2025-219)

Application

Marginal note:Application of Part

26 This Part applies in respect of high-security sites.

Licence Application

Marginal note:Additional information and documents

27 The nuclear security plan contained in an application for a licence in respect of a high-security site must contain, in addition to the information and documents required under paragraph 4(a), the following information and documents:

• (a) in the description of the proposed nuclear security system, a description of the central alarm station, the backup alarm station and the physical barriers, structures, devices and nuclear security measures in respect of each protected area, vital area and inner area in the site;

• (b) a description of the protected areas, vital areas and inner areas in the site and the potential targets of sabotage and the location of those areas and targets in the site;

• (c) information about the organizational structure, duties and training of nuclear security officers, the procedures those officers must follow and the minimum number of nuclear security officers and other personnel who will carry out duties related to security at the site;

• (d) a description of the nuclear security measures that will be implemented by the licensee to ensure that an effective intervention can be made at that site, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment;

• (e) a description of the on-site and off-site communications equipment, systems and procedures;

• (f) the tactical deployment plans developed with the off-site response force and, if any, the on-site nuclear response force, including an analysis of potential pathways for adversaries and security response times; and

• (g) for each physical barrier and nuclear security measure that is intended to delay adversaries who are described in the design basis threat or the threat and risk assessment, an analysis of the delay time provided by that barrier or measure and the data supporting that analysis.

Design Basis Threat

Marginal note:Commission to identify threats

• 28 (1) The Commission must identify any threat involving a person or group that may have the capability, motivation and intent to attempt

  • (a) the sabotage of a high-security site; or

  • (b) the unauthorized removal of Category I nuclear material or Category II nuclear material from a high-security site.

• Marginal note:Commission to inform licensee

  (2) The Commission must inform each licensee of the design basis threat.

Marginal note:Nuclear security system

• 29 (1) A licensee must design a nuclear security system taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment, evaluate the ability of the system to respond to those threats and make modifications to the system as necessary.

• Marginal note:Nuclear security measures

  (2) The licensee must implement nuclear security measures that ensure that an effective intervention can be made, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment.

• Marginal note:Record to be kept

  (3) The licensee must keep a record that sets out the processes it has implemented to design and make modifications to the nuclear security system.

Security Requirements

Nuclear Security Officers

Marginal note:Number and duties

• 30 (1) A licensee must have, at all times, a sufficient number of nuclear security officers available at a high-security site to carry out the following duties:

  • (a) conducting patrols of the site, including in the limited access area, if any;

  • (b) controlling and monitoring the movement of persons, property, Category I nuclear materials, Category II nuclear materials, Category III nuclear materials and vehicles at the site, including in the limited access area, if any;

  • (c) conducting searches of persons and everything in their possession, including any land vehicle, when they enter or exit a protected area or inner area;

  • (d) assessing and responding to nuclear security events;

  • (e) apprehending and detaining intruders;

  • (f) observing and reporting on the movements of intruders;

  • (g) assisting in making effective interventions against intruders;

  • (h) operating nuclear security systems and devices; and

  • (i) carrying out any other duties that nuclear security officers are required to carry out under these Regulations.

• Marginal note:Record to be kept

  (2) The licensee must keep a record that sets out the duties of its nuclear security officers and give a copy of it to each officer.

Marginal note:Provision of equipment

31 A licensee must provide each of its nuclear security officers with the equipment, devices and apparel that are necessary to carry out their duties.

Marginal note:Training, knowledge, skill and qualifications

• 32 (1) A licensee must ensure that a nuclear security officer does not carry out a duty unless

  • (a) they have the training, knowledge and skill that is necessary to allow them to carry out that duty; and

  • (b) they are qualified to carry out that duty.

• Marginal note:Continuing training program

  (2) The licensee must ensure that each of its nuclear security officers participates in a continuing training program that includes training regarding

  • (a) their duties and responsibilities when responding to nuclear security events, including the use of force;

  • (b) the security procedures and nuclear security measures that are relevant to their duties;

  • (c) the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment that is relevant to their duties; and

  • (d) the licensee’s obligations under the Act and its regulations that are relevant to their duties.

• Marginal note:Record to be kept

  (3) The licensee must keep a record of the training received by each of its nuclear security officers.

Marginal note:Record to be kept — firearms

33 A licensee must keep a record that sets out the following information in respect of each of its nuclear security officers whose duties require them to carry a firearm:

• (a) the officer’s name;

• (b) information that demonstrates that the officer is authorized to carry firearms in Canada and is trained and qualified to use them; and

• (c) whether or not the officer is a member of the on-site nuclear response force.

Response Forces

Marginal note:On-site nuclear response force required

• 34 (1) Subject to subsection (2), a licensee must maintain an on-site nuclear response force that, in combination with the off-site response force and the nuclear security measures for the high-security site, is capable of making an effective intervention, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment.

• Marginal note:Exception

  (2) The licensee is not required to maintain an on-site nuclear response force if

  • (a) it implements nuclear security measures that are capable of ensuring that an effective intervention can be made, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment; and

  • (b) at least 90 days before the first day on which the high-security site will operate without an on-site nuclear response force, it provides to the Commission notice in writing of its intent not to maintain one, a description of the measures referred to in paragraph (a) and information that demonstrates how implementation of those measures will ensure that an effective intervention can be made, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment.

• Marginal note:Firearms

  (3) The licensee must ensure that every nuclear security officer who is a member of its on-site nuclear response force is authorized to carry firearms in Canada and is trained and qualified to use them.

• Marginal note:Equipment

  (4) The licensee must provide nuclear security officers who are members of the on-site nuclear response force with the equipment, devices and apparel that are necessary to make an effective intervention, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment.

Marginal note:Arrangements with off-site response force

35 In addition to meeting the requirements of section 14, the written arrangements made between the licensee and the off-site response force in respect of a high-security site must provide for

• (a) the means by which an immediate and continuous communication capability is to be established between the central alarm station, the backup alarm station, nuclear security officers and the off-site response force;

• (b) the means by which the off-site response force, if requested by the licensee, is to assist the on-site nuclear response force, if any, in making an effective intervention, taking into account the design basis threat and any threat set out in the threat and risk assessment;

• (c) the duties of the on-site nuclear response force, if any, when responding to nuclear security events and how the on-site nuclear response force will integrate their response with that of the off-site response force;

• (d) if an on-site nuclear response force is not maintained at the site, the availability of a sufficient number of off-site response force members who are trained and equipped to make an effective intervention, taking into account the design basis threat and any threat set out in the threat and risk assessment; and

• (e) an annual consultation between the licensee and the off-site response force regarding site familiarization and continuing training.

Contingency Plan

Marginal note:Plan required

36 A licensee must develop and maintain a contingency plan to ensure that an effective intervention can be made, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment.

Security Drill and Security Exercise Program

Marginal note:Program elements

• 37 (1) A licensee must implement a security drill and security exercise program that, by means of physical drills, cyber security drills and security exercises, verifies and evaluates

  • (a) the readiness of security personnel; and

  • (b) the effectiveness of all elements of the contingency plan and the nuclear security system, including the nuclear security measures for the transport of nuclear substances.

• Marginal note:Program updates

  (2) The licensee must update the program after each security drill or security exercise if the results of that drill or exercise indicate that an update is necessary.

Marginal note:Security drills

• 38 (1) A licensee must conduct a security drill at least once every 30 days to test the readiness of its security personnel and the operation of one or more nuclear security measures or one or more elements of the contingency plan.

• Marginal note:Participation of nuclear security officers

  (2) The licensee must ensure that, at least once in each quarter of a given year, every nuclear security officer whose duties include the implementation of the contingency plan participates in a security drill.

Marginal note:Security exercise

• 39 (1) A licensee must, in cooperation with the off-site response force, at least once every two years, conduct a security exercise that tests

  • (a) the ability of all elements of the contingency plan and the nuclear security measures to ensure that an effective intervention can be made, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment; and

  • (b) the readiness of its security personnel and the off-site response force to respond to the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment.

• Marginal note:Notice to Commission

  (2) The licensee must notify the Commission in writing of its intent to conduct a security exercise at least four months before the day on which the exercise is to be held.

Marginal note:Records to be kept

• 40 (1) A licensee must, for each security drill and security exercise that it conducts, keep a record that contains

  • (a) an outline of the scenario for that drill or exercise;

  • (b) an evaluation of the readiness of its security personnel and the off-site response force;

  • (c) an evaluation of the effectiveness of the elements of the contingency plan and the nuclear security measures that were tested; and

  • (d) a description of any corrective actions that, taking the results of those evaluations into account, are necessary.

• Marginal note:Records to be provided — security exercise

  (2) The licensee must, within 180 days after the day on which a security exercise is completed, provide to the Commission a copy of the record for that exercise.

Marginal note:Corrective action plan

• 41 (1) If a corrective action referred to in paragraph 40(1)(d) is to be implemented using a phased approach, the licensee must create a corrective action plan that sets out

  • (a) the reasons for the corrective action;

  • (b) the rationale for the phased approach; and

  • (c) a timetable that sets out when each phase of the plan will be completed.

• Marginal note:Implementation

  (2) The licensee must implement the corrective actions and, if they are to be implemented using a phased approach, each phase must be completed in accordance with the timetable set out in the corrective action plan.

• Marginal note:Corrective action plan to be provided

  (3) The licensee must, within 90 days after the day on which the related security drill or security exercise is completed, provide a copy of the corrective action plan, if any, to the Commission.

Central Alarm Station

Marginal note:Central alarm station

• 42 (1) A licensee must ensure that the nuclear security measures referred to in subparagraphs 61(2)(a)(i) and (ii) and 68(1)(a)(i) and (ii) are monitored from a central alarm station.

• Marginal note:Requirements

  (2) The central alarm station must be

  • (a) located outside any vital area or inner area;

  • (b) designed, constructed and located so as to resist forced entry, taking into account the design basis threat and any other threat identified in the threat and risk assessment;

  • (c) attended at all times by at least one central alarm station operator;

  • (d) designed or operated so as to prevent a solitary central alarm station operator from tampering with or compromising a nuclear security measure or disabling it without the licensee’s authorization;

  • (e) equipped so as to enable a central alarm station operator inside the central alarm station to receive, assess and acknowledge the alarms referred to in subparagraphs 61(2)(a)(iii) and (b)(ii) and 68(1)(a)(iii) and (b)(ii); and

  • (f) equipped with devices that

    • (i) enable and record secure communication with nuclear security officers, nuclear security support persons and the off-site response force, and

    • (ii) are designed and installed such that the failure of one of the devices does not prevent that communication.

• Marginal note:Entry

  (3) The licensee must not permit a person to enter the central alarm station unless they are security personnel or otherwise authorized to enter by the licensee and they require entry to carry out their duties.

• Marginal note:Operational readiness

  (4) The licensee must implement processes that ensure that the central alarm station maintains operational readiness.